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A  multivariate  analysis  can  be  used  in  order  to  investigate  the 
relationship between bond yields, ratings and standard control variables. 
Replicating such a test on a number of cross-sections may evidence a 
possible impact of financial regulations relying on ratings. Datasets for 
American corporate bond issues allow a focus on two key events of the 
development of rating driven regulations: the valuation of bank and life 
insurance  portfolios  introduced  in  the  1930’s  and  the  net  capital 
requirements for broker dealers introduced in the 1970’s. The “value” of 
bond ratings does show some improvement once these regulations have 
been passed. 
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En  se  donnant  pour  cadre  la  relation  entre  rendements  de  marché, 
notations  et  variables  de  contrôle,  on  peut  répliquer  un  test 
économétrique  de  manière  à  étudier  une  influence  possible  de 
l'utilisation  des  notations  par  la  réglementation  financière.  Des 
échantillons  de  données  sur  les  obligations  d'entreprises  américaines 
permettent de s'intéresser à deux grandes étapes: la réglementation des 
portefeuilles  d'investissement  des  banques  et  des  compagnies 
d'assurance dans les années 1930 et celle des marges des courtiers en 
bourse dans les années 1970. La “valeur” des notations évolue avec la 
mise en place de ces réglementations. 
    
Mots  clés:  notations,  rendements  d’obligations,  réglementation                                                                       
financière. 
 





















In the 1930’s, a need to police life insurance and bank portfolios led American financial 
authorities to introduce rules relying on bond ratings provided by a few firms. This regulatory use of 
privately issued opinions was then left unchallenged. In the early 1970’s, the Security and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) revived this particular regulatory practice, which flourished over the last quarter of 
the twentieth century. Japanese financial authorities started to rely on ratings in the early 1980’s and 
further international adoption came over the 1990’s.  A driving force in this globalization process has 
been the Basel II general framework on bank capital requirements, which uses bond ratings as external 
credit assessments. 
This public use of ratings means a major exogenous fact for the rating game. For example, 
given the success of bond ratings as a business, one may wonder whether the use of ratings in financial 
regulations helped on the way (see Partnoy (1999)). Less vehemently, the fact that financial regulation 
uses  ratings  may  have  unduly  influenced  how  ratings  were  perceived  by  investors.  In  parallel  to 
regulatory procedures on the wake of the Enron scandal, the SEC submitted to public debate the idea 
of removing any reference to ratings in its rules (see SEC (2003b)). The Congress however chose to 
keep with ratings as regulatory inputs and to ask the SEC to oversee rating firms: a Credit Rating 
Agency Reform Act was passed in 2006 and was implemented by June 2007…  A few months later, 
concerns over the use of ratings in regulations were brought back to limelight by the critical role that 
ratings played in the rise and fall of structured finance securities. Some major policy documents stated 
that it was necessary to “reconsider” this use (see, for example, PWG (2008, 7p. 18) and FSF (2008, 
IV.8 p. 38)). The SEC reacted promptly by releasing a detailed proposal showing how almost every 
reference it made to ratings could be removed; final rules were enacted in October 2009 (see SEC 
(2008a, b &c; 2009)). This initiative may lead to a broad policy shift in financial regulations over the 
coming years.   4 
This paper investigates the concern driving these policy moves. How is it that ratings are 
recognized by investors? The usual explanations are information specialization by the bond rating firm 
and  information  equalizing  among  investors.  If  these  natural  market  forces  were  not  at  work, 
regulators would not have considered ratings as straightforward inputs…  What made these inputs 
uncontroversial was the fact that ratings were recognized by investors and this could be evidenced by 
the  relation  between  bond  ratings  and  yields.  Once  regulations  have  been  enacted,  can  the  very 
relationship that motivated regulators’ choice still be interpreted the same way? In other words: did the 
relationship between bond yields, ratings and standard control measures change significantly? 
One  may  take  advantage  of  History  by  performing  identical  tests  before  and  after  the 
enactment of these regulations. While this may be done for any relevant regulation, there are two 
reasons making the study of the early American regulations interesting. First, the impact of yet another 
regulatory use of rating may be harder to detect given a long track record of similar rulings. The first 
rules relying on ratings are likely to cause greater effects on the market place. Secondly, on a global 
scale, the use of ratings by bond markets has been quite contemporaneous to the one by their financial 
authorities  (see  Packer  (2002)  about  Japan).  The  American  bond  markets  provide  a  more  paced 
sequence of events.  
With this in mind, this paper provides a thorough discussion of West (1973), which remains 
widely quoted for pointing out a straightforward effect of rating driven regulations enacted in the 
1930’s. I have built over the original datasets and I criticize the way they have been dealt with thanks 
to modern standardized econometric techniques. This first brings a negative result: I do not find the 
lasting inflation of non-investment grade bond yields that has been interpreted as an impact of the 
regulations of  the 1930’s. By sticking to a multivariate analysis, I go beyond this negative result and 
show that the explanatory power of ratings reaches a climax on the wake of the most controversial 
rating driven regulation. To further investigate such a finding, I introduce a similar empirical setting 
around the regulation of broker dealers at the beginning of the 1970’s. Again, the “informational 
value” of bond ratings increases on the wake of the regulatory move by which the SEC revived rating 
as key regulatory tools. These two findings are hints of a regulatory value fitting into a theory of 
ratings as coordination variables: the value of ratings as “focal points” rises once authorities officially 
endorse them (see Boot et al (2006, p. 112)).  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 gives background information on bond 
ratings  as  regulatory  inputs.  Section  2  reviews the existing  literature  on  bond  ratings  and  yields. 
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1. Background Information: Ratings as Financial Regulation Tools 
 
An interesting feature of bond markets is that some firms deal with the established business of 
rating bonds on the basis of their relative financial quality. These bond ratings are meant to proxy for 
the “expected reliability in meeting future financial requirements” and have become a quite shared 
measure of default risk. These proxies are meant to be relative and organized in ordinal scales.3 While 
bond ratings were born at the turn of the twentieth century, regulatory agencies started to use these 
privately issued opinions in the 1930’s. The primary goal of this section is to introduce in full details 
these first rulings by American insurance and banking regulators. This section also sketches how the 




In 1910, the National Convention of Insurance Commissioners began publications of uniform 
price lists in order to push forward the use of market prices to value securities in insurance company 
portfolios. Yet this use of market prices proved problematic during the crises of 1907 and 1914. Over 
the 1920’s, the insurance industry evolved a doctrine holding that “ample secured” bonds should be 
valued at cost modified by accrued amortization of discount or premium. The use of market prices for 
“non-amortizable” securities however remained broad.  
In an answer to the 1931 crisis, the New York State Insurance Department ruled in 1932 that 
bonds rated in the first five rating grades by one of the rating agencies would be considered eligible for 
amortization  on  a  cost  basis.  The  decision  was  criticized  over  the  1930’s:  extensive  use  of 
amortization led to dubious valuations in front of quite low market prices. In 1940, the NAIC stated 
that amortization could be given to bond rated: i) in the first four grades by two rating agencies, ii) in 
the first five grades by three agencies or iii) in the first five grades by two agencies plus a pricing 
requirement
4. In 1953, the NAIC reformulated the eligibility criteria in two tests. “Test 1” was a rating 
from  the  first  four rating grades  of  one of  the  accredited agencies or a  number of  balance  sheet 
requirements
5. “Test 2” mainly dealt with earnings requirements
6.  
                                                 
3  A convention has eventually emerged among rating providers. This paper builds on this convention by using 
the most widely known name of a rating category preceded by its Moody’s transcription. From the highest grade 
downward, this means using the following scale: Aaa/AAA; Aa/AA; A/ A; Baa/BBB; Ba/BB; B/B; Caa/CCC;… 
The scale goes down to default grades but this paper will focus on the top grades. Note also that the historical 
discussion introduced here only deals with broad rating categories (which were refined in the early 1980’s with 
the help of “modifiers” (for example: AA  (AA-, AA, AA+) and Aa  (Aa3, Aa2, Aa1))).  
 
4 Priced at 55 or better in September, October, and November. This was  later changed to a 3.9% yield spread 
over US government bonds, which was then reduced to 1.5% in 1950. 
 
5 Depending of industry, debt ratio of 50 to 75% of total capitalization; plus a 1.5 average of before tax earnings 
coverage over five preceding years and similar 1.5 coverage in either of the last two years. 
 
6 An earnings on fixed charges ratio equal to 1 on average over 5 year and in either of the last 2 years. For 
railroad bonds, current assets equal to 125% of current liabilities. For public utilitie s and industrials, each year   6 
While criteria may have changed, the reliance on privately issued bond ratings has not been 
open  to  question.  The  modern  National  Association  of  Insurance  Commissioners  (NAIC)  bond 
classification system adopted in the early 1990’s is equating “top quality” with the first 3 rating grades 




By 1930, the Federal Reserve had begun using bond ratings in their examination of member 
bank portfolios
7. This use could be considered “informal”; in 1931, the Comptroller of the Currency 
officially adopted ratings as proper measures of the quality of the national banks’ bond accounts: 
bonds rated Baa/BBB or above would be carried at cost; bonds with lower ratings would however be 
marked  to  market  with  the  help  of  fractional  write-offs
8. This ruling  was in tune with previous 
insurance practices introduced above and then was well  received at the time (see WSJ (1931a &b); 
Harold (1938, p. 27) quotes J. Moody’s comments). During the following years, many State banking 
superintendents adopted the Comptroller’s plan (see Harold (1938, pp. 27-28)). 
In  1935,  Amendments  to  the  Federal  Banking  Act  specified  that  all  national  banks  were 
subject to the orders of the Comptroller’s Office as for the securities they might purchase for their own 
accounts. On February, 15
th 1936, the Comptroller issued a new ruling stating that “the purchase of 
investment  securities  in  which  the  investment  characteristics  are  distinctly  and  predominantly 
speculative, or investment in securities of a lower designated standard than those which are distinctly 
and predominantly speculative, is prohibited”. A footnote added that “the terms applied herein may be 
found in recognized rating manuals” (see Harold, (1938 p. 30)).  
This more radical decision spurred unprecedented hostility about the use of bond ratings as 
tools to influence the structure of commercial banks portfolios (see WSJ (1936a &b)). It also created 
confusion  about  what  the  footnote  exactly  meant  because  it  was  relying  on  an  unsettled  market 
convention: Moody’s kept interpreting the ruling as pointing to Baa/BBB as a cutoff but the American 
Banker considered A/A (see Moody’s (2004, pp. 1-2)). The Comptroller refused to make this point 
clear and then stated that ratings were not “the sole criterion, or even a necessary criterion, for judging 
whether  or  not  a  particular  bond  was  eligible  for  purchase  by  a  national  bank”;  nonetheless, 
controversies did not quiet down (see WSJ (1936c, d &e)).  
                                                                                                                                                         
adjusted  earnings  equal  to  mandatory  principal  payments  and  sinking  fund  requirements  (excluding  final 
maturities), or working capital equal to 100% of long-term debt. Further modifications were made for new 
enterprises or special obligations (see Atkinson (1967, 3 p. 37 - 1 p. 39)). 
 
7 In Osterhus (1931), a member of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York introduced a system for weighting a 
bank’s  entire  portfolio  based  on  credit  ratings,  so  that  the  portfolio’s  “safety”  or  “desirability”  could  be 
expressed in a single number, referred to as a “desirability weighting.” Harold (1938, 3p.25) mentions the use 
Harold (1938, 3p.25) mentions the use of systems similar to this one by several branches of the Federal Reserve. 
 
8 Mimeographed ruling issued by J.W. Pole, then Comptroller of the Currency, not dated, although was made on 
September 11, 1931 according to The Commercial and Financial Chronicle (No.133, 09/12/1931, p. 1672).    7 
The  footnote  was  deleted  only  but  a  few  days  after  all  federal  banking  authorities  had 
published an agreement more in tune with the original 1931 ruling
9. A joint statement by the Secretary 
of the Treasury, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Directors of the F ederal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Comptroller of  the Currency was made on June, 27
th 1938. 
Following this 1938 Agreement, bonds would be divided into groups and the first four rating grades 
would provide a privileged status (by being valued at their purchase price or at par and by being 
therefore insulated from day-to-day price fluctuations)
10.  
The use of ratings by all federal banking authorities was now clearly set. For individual banks, 
this meant that informational requirements and uncertainties would be minimized for investments in 
the top four rating categories while lower rated or even unrated bonds would require an added burden 
of justification. In 1949, the Executive Committee of the National Association of Supervisors of State 
Banks joined the Federal authorities in reaffirming the process outlined by the 1938 statement (see 
Federal Reserve (1949)). This process has remained at the heart of American banking regulations to 
date. For example, White (2009, p. 3) mentions that its applicatio n to saving institutions in 1989 
brought selling pressures to the junk bond market.  
The regulation of insurance investment however took some years to adjust its own system to 
this new convention. Remember from  section 1. 1 that, up until 1953, insurance c ompanies could 
consider bonds that were rated one notch below the “cut-off” required by banking authorities. This 
precision aside, the use of ratings by financial regulators was now affirmed more than ever. It would 
then be left unquestioned and find new applications.  
 
1.3 Securities Law  
 
Post-world war II decades brought a standstill ended by the SEC adopting Rule 15c3-1 on 
broker-dealers as an answer to the credit crises of the early 1970’s.  This rule set forth “haircut” 
requirements based on the credit ratings assigned to the asset. A “haircut” is the percentage of a 
financial asset’s market value a broker-dealer is required to deduct for the purpose of calculating its 
net capital requirement
11. This ruling was nothing more than another use of ratings in checking on the 
                                                 
9 The deletion became effective on July 1
st 1938. 
 
10 Book value for bonds of Group I (Aaa to Baa inclusive); current market value plus any unrealized 50 cent 
depreciation on them should be charged against net bank capital for Group II (Ba or below  or unrated securities 
of equivalent value), Group III referred t o securities in default while group IV was for equities  (see Federal 
Reserve (1938)). Note also that, as in the original 1931 rule, American sovereign and sub -sovereign issues are 
not concerned by this process. 
 
11 Partnoy (1999, footnote 344 p. 690) refers to Notice of Revision Proposed Amendments to Rule 15c3-1 under 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Release No. 34-10, 525, 1973 SEC LEXIS 2309 (Nov. 29, 1973): “The 
Commission to a limited extent has also recognized the usefulness of the nationally recognized statistical rating 
organizations as a basis for establishing a dividing line for securities with a greater or lesser degree of market 
volatility.” SEC (2003, note 9 p.6), as most other sources, points to the final enactment: Adoption of Amendments   8 
“safety and soundness” of a financial intermediary investments. SEC (2003, note 9 p.6) mentions two 
historical  precedents:  (i)  certain  securities  exchanges,  including  the  New  York  Stock  Exchange 
(NYSE),  already  utilized  ratings  to  calculate  haircuts  following  their  respective  net  capital  rules 
(NYSE Rule 325(c)(5) and (c)(6)); (ii) a number of states also used the concept of ratings to limit the 
investment discretion of certain fiduciaries and relied only on ratings provided by firms designated as 
reliable by the state. However, for the first time it included the creation of a Nationally Recognized 
Statistical Rating Organization (NRSRO) status. 
The existence of this NRSRO status paved the way for numerous uses of ratings by the SEC 
and by other regulatory bodies. There have then been credit-rating dependent rules and regulations 
promulgated under the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Investment 
Company Act of 1940, and various banking, insurance, pension, and real estate regulations (for a 
tentative overall picture see SEC (2003a, pp. 6-8)).  
SEC (2008b, c, &d) give details on all the uses of ratings by the SEC. Yet another example of 
safety and soundness regulation is the use of ratings to check on money market fund portfolios. In the 
1980’s, the Agency somewhat innovated by using ratings to deal with the very process of security 
offerings on which the Securities Exchange Act had focused: good ratings would now screen high 
quality offerings for which the issuance requirements would be eased
12. 
 
1.4 Collateral policy 
 
In a detailed discussion of the 1930’s banking regulations introduced in section 1.2, Palyi 
(1938, 3 p. 75) noted that a “carrot” came with the “stick” of the new rules for valuing bank’s portfolio 
(relevant in a context of mandatory examinations by comptrollers). This carrot was the fact that once 
investment  grade  securities  were  officially  recognized  as  safe  investments,  little  argument  could 
prevent them from being posted as collateral (see Federal Reserve (1937)). 
While there has been much debate on the possible shortcomings of using ratings to guide 
bank’s  portfolio  evaluations,  it  must  be  said  that  ratings  have  always  been  thought  as  guides. 
Examinators could end up departing from a straightforward use. Although to a limited extent, this 
point  could  be  made  about  the  1930’s  regulations,  it  holds  even  more  for  the  modern  Basel  II 
framework thanks to the alternatives to third party ratings (pilars 2 and 3). On the contrary, once 
collateral policy starts using ratings, these privately issued opinions serve as the basis for numerous 
                                                                                                                                                         
to Rule 15c3–1 and Adoption of Alternative Net Capital Requirement for Certain Brokers and Dealers, Release 
No. 34–11497 (June 26, 1975), 40 FR 29795 (July 16, 1975).  
 
12 This means allowing “shelf registration” and using short form Securities Act registration statements (forms S-
3 and F-3).  In 1982, this was first allowed for investment grade non convertible domestic bond issues but was 
later transposed for foreign issues and then for Asset Backed Securities (ABS). Note also that, independently 
from these regulations and starting in 1984, rule 415 of the Securities Act gave this eligibility to every mortgage 
related security rated in the two top notches of the rating scale by a registered rating firm (NRSRO).    9 
transactions  between  the  central  bank  and  the  market  place:  they  are  unequivocally  endorsed  as 
screens for quality.  
The  attitude  of  the  European  Central  Bank  (ECB)  makes  this  point  clear.  The  European 
Operational Framework came out of a compromise between numerous central bank practices and 
emerged as “collateral intensive” (see IMF (2008, figure 1 p.16 and Appendix 3 p. 55)). Although the 
European Central Bank (ECB) always pointed out that third party rating providers were only one 
source of information out of four in the European Credit Assessment Framework (ECAF), it felt 
required  to  create  its  own  “ECAF  relevant”  designation  for  third  party  ratings.  Note  that  the 
implementation of the BASEL II framework in Europe had reached a point to which most of the 
concerned rating  providers  had  already  been  registered  by  banking  regulators (as  External  Credit 
Assessment Institutions (ECAI)). Nonetheless, the use of ratings in collateral policy proved so critical 
that it led the ECB to create both a designation process and a monitoring framework (see ECB (2006 
&2007)). 
The crisis of structured finance also brought this point to limelight. Other major central banks 
answered to financial difficulties by working on their collateral policy. In so doing, their increasing 
straightforward  reliance  on  rating  providers  caught  public  attention.  While  the  Bank  of  England 
rulings explicitly named the three leaders of the global rating business (S&P, Moody’s and Fitch)), the 
Board of the Federal Reserve used a sentence implicitly doing the same thing (see (see IMF (2008, 
box 5 p. 63) and Bluementhal (2009)). To detractors deeply convinced that these firms had fuelled 
market disruptions with structured finance securities, this reliance was to say the least puzzling (see 
(Bluementhal (2009)). 
Although discussing on collateral policy brought a global point of view, overall, this section 
focused on how American financial authorities came to use ratings in an increasing number of rules. 
The regulatory use of ratings has first been mirrored in Japan in the early 1980’s and ratings as 
regulatory tools have been promoted internationally through the advancement of the Basel II scheme 
for the global standardization of bank regulations. Providing a global picture of the official uses of 
ratings is a difficult task (see IMF (1999, Table A6.2 p.156) and BIS (2000) for tentative tables; 
JFRAC (2009) gives a thorough listing). Beyond such a task, remember that outside the United States 
most bond markets previously worked without privately issued bond ratings. On a global scale, the 
adoption of ratings by economic agents has thus been quite contemporaneous to the one by their 
financial authorities. With this in mind, the United States provides an interesting historical experiment.  
From publishers of opinions on creditworthiness, rating firms ended up providing information 
as to the future treatment by financial regulations. A theory of rating agencies as “regulatory licenses 
providers” has even been formulated (see Partnoy (1999, p. 681)). This generalizing effort aside, 
numerous observers have wondered about the potential impacts of the use of ratings by financial 
regulation.  With  such  a  concern  in  mind,  a  straightforward  field  of  investigation  is  the  relation 
between ratings and yields.    10 
2. Literature Review: Bond Ratings and Yields 
 
Bond ratings are ultimately valued because they are recognized as a shared measure of bond 
default risk by investors. Investigating their relationship with bond yields then makes sense in order to 
elaborate on the rationality of their use
13. Bond yields can be offering yields at issuance on the primary 
market, actual yields as quoted on the second market or realized yields once the bond came to expire.  
Looking at realized yields is an ex post analysis. For example, considering bond issues over 
1900-1943, Hickman (1958, table 1 p. 10) came to the conclusion that, on average, actual loss rates 
did not completely eliminate the higher yields that had been accorded to lower rated bonds. This 
finding was then restudied and contested by Fraine &Mills (1961). It however remained a piece of 
evidence that could be interpreted as a claim for a more active trading of high yield debt securities
14. 
Along with the rise of the high yield (or “junk”) bond market from 1977, further investigations focused 
on whether investors in speculative bonds could be more than satisfactorily compensated for default 
risk (see, for example, Fitzpatrick &Severiens (1978)). Producing evidence on the overcompensation 
for default risk by high yield debt securities would usually go along with noting that demand for these 
securities had been constrained by legal restrictions for a number of institutional investors (see, for 
example, Altman (1989, 4 p. 921))
 15.  
Focusing on realized yields, the use of ratings by safety and soundness regulations has then 
been used to justify evidence going against the efficiency of bond markets. Proving a superiority of 
high  yield  investment  is  however  not  a  straightforward  exercise.  The  early  literature  dealt  with 
averages  of  lifespan  realized  returns  and  results  proved  sensible  to  variations  in  risk  premia,  to 
changes in the level of interest rates and to early redemptions (see Fraine (1937) versus Dewing (1926, 
p. 1,192 -1,195) and Fraine &Mills (1961) versus Hickman (1958)). Modern contributions introduced 
annualized returns and more refined analysis building on the risk/reward trade-off (see, for example, 
Fons (1987), Altman (1989) and Blume et al. (1991)). Yet the computation of default rates remained 
quite controversial. For example, Asquith et al. (1989) criticized earlier studies for not taking into 
account exchanges and for poorly dealing with the aging effect on bonds. Precisely, building on data 
from Fraine &Mills (1961), Fridson (1994, pp. 49-50) shows that the “odd” finding in Hickman (1958) 
was  driven  by  a  small  share  of  “irregulars  offerings”  (in  other  words,  offered  through  contract 
modifications  in  already  outstanding  issues  and  through  exchanges  related  to  corporate 
reorganizations). 
                                                 
13 In order to study the behavior of bond market agents, it has been a convention to focus on the annual rates of 
return implied by bond prices or yields as they are referred to. 
 
14  Fridson  (1994,  p.  43)  notes  that  even  severe  critics  of  M.  Milken  and  Drexel  Burnham  conceded  this 
interpretation to junk bond market makers. The legend also says that reading Hickman (1958) in business school 
led M. Milken to start his now famous career. 
 
15  Harold  (1938,  p.  v)  provides  an  early  statement  of  the  basis  of  this  kind  of  argument:  “Following  the 
Comptroller of the Currency statement on 02/15/1936, it became common knowledge in bond circles that bond 
rated below that of “a business man investment “(BBB, Baa, B**, B1+) could almost never be sold to a bank.”   11 
When evidencing a superiority of high yield investment has been recognized as a challenging 
task, focusing on historical yields appears less welcome. For example, in a follow-up study to the 
famous work of Stigler (1964) on registered securities and the 1933 Securities Act, Jarell (1981, pp. 
654) acknowledges that using data from the Hickman studies brings little results and advocates an 
analysis of yields and market variability. Turning to an ex ante analysis may indeed prove a more 
straightforward way to deal with a possible impact of relevant regulations. This means looking either 
at offering yields or at actual yields and the relevant literature can be introduced with the help of the 
following questions: 
a) Do bond yields react to a change in bond ratings? 
b) Are bond ratings relevant to explain bond yields? 
Dealing with a) means introducing a temporal analysis and then requires continuous data from the 
second market (see, for example, Weinstein (1977)). This can become quite a challenge since bond 
markets do not always prove liquid. Researchers have then naturally turned to the stock market for real 
time quotations (see, for example, Hand et al. (1992)). Jorion et al. (2005) used investigations of this 
kind to show an impact of the first regulation clearly giving an informational advantage to rating firms 
over equity investors
16. 
Given  data  limitations  with  bond  market  quotations,  a  focus  on  b)  makes  sense  for  an 
historical  investigation.  This  involves  a  cross  examination  of  bond  ratings,  control  variables  and 
yields. This kind of analysis can be fed by data either on offering yields at issuance or on actual yields 
computed from the prices on the second market
17. A review of literature may be: West (1973), Liu 
&Thakor (1984), Ederington et al. (1987), Reiter &Ziebart (1991), Brister et al. (1994), Levingston et 
al. (2003). The focus is on evidencing an informational value of ratings, in other words on testing the 
following null hypothesis: 
 
(ho) :        “Bond ratings do not have an explanatory power” 
 
For example, Ederington et al. (1987) “explores the information content” of Moody’s and S&P 
ratings beyond publicly available accounting variables by relating them to the yield to maturity. The 
authors used a non-linear least square procedure on data concerning bonds traded on February, 28
th 
1979 and 1981. Also, Levingston et al. (2003, pp. 4-6) uses a latent variable methodology and yields 
on  new  industrial  bond  issues  to  focus  on  whether  bond  ratings  contain  non-publicly  available 
information.   
                                                 
16 Implemented on October 23, 2000, regulation Full-Disclosure (F-D) prohibits American public companies 
from doing selective disclosures to a broad category of “investment professionals”. Rating firms were granted an 
exclusion from this list and these authors investigates whether this brought a strategic advantage by looking for a 
greater impact of rating change announcements on stock prices. 
 
17 While mixing studies using actual  yields and offering yields has  been common (see Liu &Thakor (1984, 
footnote 4 p. 348) criticizing this point), studies focusing on the impact of multiple ratings on yields at issuance 
have usually been set aside (see, for example , Liu &Moore (1987), Billingsley et al. (1985), Hsueh &Kidwell 
(1988), Thompson &Vaz (1990)).   12 
An  early  contribution  to  this  body  of  literature  did  something  else  than  focusing  on  an 
informational content of ratings. Fisher (1959) produced classical a study of corporate bond yields 
using a log/log transformation of the common Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression analysis. West 
(1973) picked up on that study by looking at the relationship between the regression residuals and 
Moody’s ratings. As opposed to 1927, 1932 and 1937, the behavior of these residuals could be linked 
to the investment grade status in 1949 and 1953. This result could be interpreted as an impact of the 
regulations enacted in the 1930’s (see, supra, section 1.2).  
When this result has often been mentioned or commented, the issue of sorting the investigated 
informational value from a regulatory value has then been poorly faced. To my knowledge, such a 
concern can only be found in Brister et al. (1994). Echoing the literature dealing with realized yields, 
the authors focus on a straightforward reading of existing regulations and proceed with several tests on 
offering yields over 1982-1987. The goal is to find an ex post piece of evidence by showing how non-
investment grade bond yields are above the levels that could be expected by judging on default risk. 
While the discussion in West (1973) did share this focus on the investment grade distinction, the 
methodology had a more neutral perspective taking advantage of the spacing of cross-sections in 
Fisher  (1959). This  more  neutral  perspective  means  studying  the  relationship  between  yields  and 
ratings  before  and  after  the  enactment  of  regulations.  It  can  be  formulated  by  investigating  the 
following “meta-null hypothesis”: 
 
(Ho):    “The explanatory power of ratings does not systematically change over years” 
 
Departing  from  a  focus  on  the  over-inflation  of  non-investment  grade  bond  yields,  this 
concern  about  the  robustness  of  the  relationship  between  ratings  and  yields  makes  two  tasks 
interesting. First, the “two stage” methodology of West (1973) is somewhat peculiar and an open 
question is whether a more conventional multivariate design would bring the same findings. Secondly, 
a similar empirical setting can be worked out in order to check whether these findings hold for cross-
sections surrounding the 1975 regulation of broker dealers by the SEC.  
The  following  empirical  analysis  undertakes  these  two  tasks.  This  goal  is  of  course 
constraining. I have mentioned above the dynamics of the relationship between rating and yields as an 
alternative. Another one is to build tailored tests to check the impact of an exogenous event on the 
value of ratings
18. Kisgen &Strahan (2009) discusses on cumulative yields per rating category over the 
weeks following the official designation of the Canadian DBRS by the SEC in February 2003 . These 
authors  evidence  an  impact  driven  by  cases  where  DBRS  was  less  conservative  than  already 
designated rating firms and larger around the investment grade cut-off. They interpret their findings as 
pointing to  an  effect  of  rating  based  regulations  on  firm’s  cost  of  capital.  Sharing  an  historical 
perspective with this paper, Gaillard (2008, pp. 93-111) introduces a broad discussion on cumulative 
                                                 
18 This was first done for checking whether the unannounced refinement of Moody’s rating scale in April 1982 
had any impact (see Kliger &Sarig (2000) and Tang (2009)).   13 
yields per rating category over the weeks following rating driven regulation enactments in 1931 and in 
1936 and concludes to a limited impact. 
 
 
3. Empirical Framework  
 
As in Merton (1974, p. 449), let us start with the assumption that:    
Yi = f (Ci, Xi, YREFi, ε1i)                                        (1) 
 where,  Yi : yield to maturity on the issue i 
  Ci : issuer’s creditworthiness 
                Xi : issue i “other characteristics” 
                          YREFi : yield on the chosen risk free issue 
                 ε1i : random error 
 
A first step is to change the target variable in order to focus on the spread between the yield on 
the issue i and the yield on the chosen risk free issue
19:  
YSprdi = Yi - YREFi = f (Ci, Xi, ε2i)                                                          (2) 
 
A second step is to raise the issue of ratings’ relevance. West (1973) did it in a way that can be 
interpreted as a special case of the following Levene’s test: 
ε2i = f (Ci, Ri, Xi, ε3i)                                      (3) 
 
There is however no reason against including ratings in equation (2) and the starting overall 
specification should be: 
YSprdi = f (Ci, Ri, Xi, ε4i)                                   (4) 
where,   YSprdi : yield spread on the issue i 
 Ci : issuer’s creditworthiness 
                Ri : bond rating of the issue i 
               Xi : issue i other characteristics  
                ε4i : random error 
 
The empirical analysis will run two specifications of this general model, respectively on five 
cross sections surrounding the 1930’s rulings and on three cross sections surrounding the early 1970’s 
enactment. Data issues are introduced before turning to the choices guiding the specification of this 
overall model.  
 
 
                                                 
19 The spread is absolute as opposed to relative (Yi - YREFi)/ YREFi).The basis of YREFi is the yield on US 
Treasury  bonds,  which  of  course  are  not  exempt  from  risk  but  have  extensively  been  used  as  a  pure  rate 
approximation. The methodology used while computing the spread is aimed at being a replication of the one 
displayed in Fisher (1959, appendix A p.52) with the slight change of building the Treasury yield curve thanks to 
CRSP fixed term indices (as opposed to using yields from the board of the Federal Reserve).   14 
3.1 Data  
 
In order to deal with 1930’s regulations, building datasets starts by computing data from the 
Appendix of L. Fisher’s PhD dissertation thesis (see Fisher (1959, appendix D p.66)). These original 
datasets are several samples of average yield spreads according to prices on bond issues outstanding 
on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) on December 31
st. These “risk premia” are given per issuer 
and along with financial ratios. Replicating R. West’s work, these datasets have been matched with the 
relevant issues of the Moody’s manuals
20.  
In order to deal with the 1970’s ruling, the starting point has been data communications by 
S&P and Moody’s according to their archiving of American corporate bond rating histories. These 
datasets provide bond ratings outstanding on December 31
st 1971, 1973 and 1975. At the end of 1973, 
the use of ratings by the SEC has been recently proposed and at the end of 1975, the rule 15c3–1 has 
been on for 6 months (see, supra, note 8). When information on the bond issue bearing the rating was 
missing, it has been found in the Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD). In order to get 
information on the issuing company, the resulting datasets were merged with the Compustat North 
America Industrial Annually database. The next step is to compute actual yields. To be able to do so, 
bond prices have been hand-computed following the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) quotations as 
reported by the Bank and Quotation Report. Last but not least, the outcome was a number of datasets 
plotting ratings, prices, etc., per bond issue. To ensure comparability with the tests for the 1930’s, 
weighted  average  yield  spreads  per  bond  issuer  had  to  be  computed.  The  respective  outstanding 
amounts were found in the relevant issues of the Moody’s Industrials and Public Utilities manuals
21. 
Table 1 displays the respective populations per rating categories. 
 
Table 1 – Sample Size and Rating Categories 


















  Aaa/ AAA  10  3  4  1  2  9  11  15 
Aa/ AA  9  4  5  12  16  24  31  32 
A/ A  15  4  8  15  29  50  57  79 






















  Ba/ BB  14  10  19  13  8  3  4  3 
B/ B  --  10  10  2  4  4  6  5 
Caa/CCC  --  --  2  --  --  --  --  -- 
  Total (N)  66  45  75  59  80  105  123  152 
               -- : unrelevant 
                                                 
20 Unfortunately, this did not lead to a perfect replication… the differences are however sufficiently small to be 
overlooked. Compare datasets size in Table 1 to the following ones inferred from West (1973, table 2 p. 166): 67 
(1927); 44 (1932); 84 (1937); 63 (1949); 81 (1953). 
 
21 These are averages given all variables in our model. Doing so, ratings from Moody’s and S&P are treated as 
equivalent. Observations do remain distinct in case of (a) a different level of proxies for bond covenants or (b) a 
difference between S&P and Moody’s ratings (a split rating; a limited access to historical data makes it very rare 
in the present setting).   15 
3.2 Variable selection 
 
Table 2 summarizes data definitions and sources. With equation (4) in mind, the main concern 
is to account for credit risk (Ci). A first and conventional step is to focus on financial ratios. This can 
lead to a broad discussion and to a quite extensive set of relevant predictors (see, for example, Chan 
&Jengadesh (2001, Appendix p. 23)). Note however that the exercise is neither about finding the best 
approximation for credit risk nor about aiming at the best ratings determinants. The goal is to find a set 
of control variables that can be viewed as a potential standard for a typical investor: a balance has to 
be stricken between accuracy and simplicity. A minimal requirement is to pick financial ratios from at 
least each of the following broad categories: i) liquidity, ii) profitability and iii) capital structure. An 
example is: i) liquidity: the volume of bond outstanding
22, ii) profitability: the  9 years net income 
variation coefficient and iii) capital structure: the ratio of equity market value on par value of debt. 
These variables and a proxy for financial reliability make the Fisher (1959) model.  
The building of new datasets  for the early 1970’s brought the opportunity to depart from a 
straight use of this Fisher (1959) model. Previous studies could be interpreted as pointing out the 
choice of: i) liquidity: firm size, ii) profitability: interest coverage or operating margin and return on 
assets, iii) any measure of leverage (see Livingston et al. (2008, p. 17 and table 1 p. 39)). This said, 
looking for a standard way to analyze default risk, the success and common use of the Z score models 
must be outlined (see Altman (1968) and Altman (2000)). It has indeed been quite common to plot Z 
scores against ratings.  Brister  et al.  (1994)  replicated  a  Z  score  methodology  in  order  to  use the 
computed scores as default risk proxies in a cross examination of ratings and yields. This two stepped 
process started with a Multi Discriminant Analysis, which went along with several hypotheses and 
computational complexity. Rather than focusing on the output of a Z score model, the inputs make an 
interesting set of predictors for credit risk. For instance, Altman &Rijken (2004) uses these Z score 
determinants to build an “agency rating prediction model” and to run ordinal logit regressions. This 
model was also including the number of years since a company was first rated by a company (see 
Altman &Rijken (2004, p. 2686)). This can be considered as adding a proxy for financial reliability to 
a  set  of  widely  acknowledged  financial  ratios.  This  “agency  ratings  prediction  model”  is  then 
particularly interesting in an investigation parallel to one dealing with the Fisher (1959) model.  
Still with equation (4) in mind, dealing with issue characteristics other than default risk (Xi) is 
a rather difficult task. The bond prospectus may include numerous features and their relevance for the 
bond pricing process is open to discussion (see Kose et al. (2008)). A cautious strategy can then be to 
gather a sample of bond issues with similar features and hence focus on ratings and default risk 
variables (see Livingston et al. (2003, 2 p. 22)). In a similar manner, Fisher (1959) took care of these 
characteristics  during  the  computation  of  yield  spreads.  Building  the  datasets  for  the  1970’s, 
                                                 
22 Original purpose of the volume of bond outstanding was to account for marketability but has then traditionally 
been interpreted as a proxy for liquidity.   16 
information  on  the  subordination  and  security  level  of  bond  issues  could  be  gathered  and  is 
summarized thanks to two dummies variables (SUB and SEC). There is unfortunately no account of 
other common features such as the presence of a call and/or the one of a sinking fund. 
Last but not least, Fisher (1959) focused on industrial bond issues. Gathering data on the early 
1970’s gave the opportunity to get a broader view: original datasets covered corporate bond issues and 
then  mixed industrials and  utilities issues, which  are  usually  considered  as two  different realms 
(especially  when  dealing  with  financial  ratio  analysis).  Instead  of  splitting  the  datasets,  what  is 
proposed here is the other option of including a dummy variable coding for public utilities (UTILITY) 
to the model. Table 2 summarizes variable definitions and data sources. 
 
Table 2 – Variables Definitions and Sources 












Weighted averages (given all variables in 
the  models  and  using  outstanding 
volumes on 31
st) of absolute yield spread 
(Yi – YREFi) 
 
Fisher (1959, appendix D p.66) 
Bank and Quotation record 
CRSP Monthly Treasury fixed term 
indices and Fama risk free rate  
Moody’s manuals 
PROFa 
Net income after all charges and taxes:  
9 years variation coefficient 
 (=standard deviation / arithmetic mean ) 
Fisher (1959, appendix D p.66, x1) 
PROFb  Retained earnings / Total assets  Compustat Industrials Annually  
(data 36 / data 6) 
PROFc 
Earnings before interest and taxes / Total 
assets 
Compustat Industrials Annually 
( (data 170 + data 15) / data 6)) 
LEVa  Market value of equity / par value of debt  Fisher (1959, appendix D p.66, x3) 
LEVb 
Market value of equity / book value of 
total liabilities 
Compustat Industrials Annually 
((data 24 * data 25) / data 181) 
LIQUIa  Bond outstanding volume   Fisher (1959, appendix D p.66, x4) 
LIQUIb 
Book value of total liabilities / US equity 
market capitalization 
Compustat Industrials Annually (data 
181) and CRSP database 
LIQUIc  Working capital  / Total assets  Compustat Industrials Annually  
(data 179 / data 6) 
BCKGRNDa 
Period of solvency since creation or last 
default episode   Fisher (1959, appendix D p.66, x2) 
BCKGRNDb 
Years since a firm was first rated by an 












  RATING 
Effect codings for bearing Moody’s 
and/or S&P’s ratings  
Moody’s manuals 
S&P and Moody’s communications 
SPLIT 
Dummy coding for: “two different ratings 
levels given all other predictors” 
Moody’s manuals 
S&P and Moody’s communications 
SUB  Dummy coding for subordination  S&P dataset and Mergent FISD 
SEC  Dummy coding for security  S&P dataset and Mergent FISD 
UTILITY  Dummy coding for public utilities  Compustat issuer codes   17 
3.3 Model specification 
 
Using the previous remarks and building on equation (4):  
YSprdi, = f (LIQUwi, PROFxi, LEVyi, BCKGRNDzi, Rj, Xj, ε4ai)                        (4a) 
      Where, YSprdi : yield spread on issue i   
LIQUwi : Liquidity proxy “w” for issuer of i  
PROFxi: Profitability proxy “x” for issuer of i 
LEVyi : Leverage proxy “y” for issuer of i 
BCKGRNDzi: financial background proxy “z” for issuer of i 
Ri : bond rating level for issue i 
Xi : other characteristics of issue i 
ε4ai : random error 
 
Furthermore, following Fisher (1959), a new target variable is defined as follows: 
 
If there is any k ≥ 1, such as LIQUwi = LIQUwi+1 = (…) = LIQUwi+k 
          AND PROFxi = PROFxi+1 = (…) = PROFxi+k 
              (…) 
          AND Xi = Xi+k  
 
     
   Then,           AYSPRDi =      ωj YSprdj,  /       ωj  ,      where ωj: outstanding volume on issue j 
 
   Otherwise, AYSPRDi = YSprdi, 
 
For datasets intended to deal with 1930’s regulation enactment, the first task is to provide a 




Log (AYSprdi) = α2a + β2a1Log(1/PROFai) + β2a2 Log(LEVai) + β2a3Log(LIQUIa i) 
                                            + β2a4 Log(BCKGRNDai) + ε2a i                                                   (2a) 
 
 
ε2ai = α3a + β3a1Log(1/PROFai) + β3a2 Log(LEVai) + β3a3 Log(LIQUIa i)  
  + β3a4 Log(BCKGRNDai) + RATINGi + ε3ai                                       (3a) 
 
where, α, β : constants 
                     ε : random error 
 
Equation (2a) is a standard ordinary least square (OLS) regression case that allows a check on 
how the present empirical setting replicates the one of Fisher (1959). Controlling for the variability in 
regression residuals, equation (3a) is a Levene’s test handled thanks to Generalized Linear Model 
statistical routines. Equation (3a) checks on the relevancy of the tailored “two stage” analysis found in 
i+k 
∑   
j =i 
 i+k 
 ∑  
j =i   18 
West (1973). Furthermore, the results of this close discussion motivate a straightforward multivariate 
setting using the following ANCOVA equation: 
 
 
Log (AYSprdi) = α4b + β4b1Log(1/PROFa i) + β4b2Log(LEVa i) + β4b3Log(LIQUIa i)  
         + β4b4Log(BCKGRNDa i) + RATINGi + ε4bi           (4b) 
 
To  deal  with  the  regulation  of  broker  dealers  in  the  early  1970’s,  similar  multivariate 





Log (AYSprdi) = α4c + β4c1Log(1-PROFbi) + β4c2Log(1- PROFci) + β4c3Log(LEVbi) 
                     + β4c4Log(LIQUIbi) + β4c5Log (1-LIQUIci) + β4c6Log(BCKGRNDb i) 
                  + β4c7SUB i + β5c8SECi + β4c9SPLITi + β4c10UTILITYi + RATINGi  
        + ε4ci                                     (4c) 
where,    α, β :  constants 
          ε : random error 
 




For each of the cross-sections surrounding rating driven regulations of the 1930’s, table 3 
provides a summary of statistical outputs. The first set of columns gives results for the Fisher (1959) 
model alone (equation 2a). It can be seen that this model performs well and in line with previously 
reported results given in annex A. However, in the second set of columns (equation 3a), the study of 
residuals shows that these regressions are not perfect: non constant variance remains in all years 
except 1927. A further result is that ratings help explaining this non constant variance in 1932, 1937 
and 1953. Yet note that the coefficients for non-investment grades are not statistically significant. This 
finding provides a critique of the analysis found in West (1973).  
Going beyond such a critique means focusing on the fact that ratings can help reduce the non-
constant variance in the residuals of the regressions using the Fisher (1959) model. Ratings could be 
treated as an originally omitted variable. But, as pointed out before writing equation (4), there is no 
reason to omit ratings in a straightforward multivariate analysis. For this reason, the first columns of 
table  4  give  the  results  of  an  ANCOVA  analysis  with ratings  as  a  categorical  variable  and  with 
covariates relying on Fisher (1959) (equation 4b). When residuals did exhibit non-constant variance, a 
weighted  analysis  has  been  performed.  In  straight  line  with  the  results  displayed  in  table  3,  this   19 
analysis was not needed for 1927. In all other cases, non constant variance has been addressed as far 





Given this weighted analysis, the R² displayed in Table 4 are not straightforward goodness of 
fit measures
24. With this disclaimer in mind, the overall performance seems to ha ve benefited from 
introducing  rating  along  with  the  Fisher  (1959)  model.  Furthermore,  this  overall  performance 
increases to reach a peak in 1937 and then decreases so that the level in 1953 is similar to the one in 
1927. West (1973, note 22 p.165) stated that including ratings with the help of dummies and running a 
multivariate analysis led to an unfortunate perturbation in the estimation of coefficients for predictors. 
Introducing a RATING variable in the multivariate analysis has certainly put BCKGRNDa to a test. 
However, the three other covariates perform well and when coefficients are significant their sign is 
similar to the one in the Ordinary Least Square setting. Last but not least, the statistical significance of 
RATING is always validated. 
                                                 
23 Further details about this analysis are available upon request to the author 
 
24 The reported value are not R² = 1  – (Residual Sum of Square/Total Sum of Square) but approximations 
defined by R² = (pF) / (pF + n – p – 1) where p is the number of predictors in the model. 
   20 
   21 
The second set of columns on table 4 deals with genuine cross-sections at the beginning of the 
1970’s (equation 4c). Considering that the detailed discussion of West (1973) has shown that the 
multivariate analysis was appropriate, here are the results of an ANCOVA setting involving ratings 
and the Altman &Rijken (2004) model. Again, a weighted analysis has been found helpful. To justify 
this analysis, non constant variance in residuals has first been evidenced by using all the predictors in 
the model and the Standard & Poor’s Industry Classification (SIC) codes. Using weights has been 
successful in correcting non constant variance as far as can be judged by this limited set of control 
variables
25. The goodness of fit measures indicate  fair results. The performance remains similar in 
1971 and 1973 and rises in 1975. Only RATING and two covariates (LIQUIb and 1 -PROFb) have an 
explanatory power for every investigated year. LEVb, LIQUIb and SUB proved significant twice; 
UTILITY is significant only once. 1- PROFc, SEC and SPLIT never have an explanatory power.  
By looking at  the results of these two multivariate settings, one has to reject the first null 
hypothesis for every investigated year and admit: (ha) = “ratings have an explanatory power“. But “an 
explanatory power” may not be enough for a categorical variable. Since the chosen ANCOVA models 
do not include interactions, the significance of RATING can be further assessed with the help of 
Tukey multiple comparison tests. Table 5 gives a summary of the produced results. The process is 
iterative: after picking the top rating category as a reference, the relevance of sorting this category 
(Aaa/ AAA) from the next ones is tested; then the relevance of the second one (Aa/ AA) against the 
remaining categories; and so on. These tests control for the fact that a categorical variable may reach 
statistical significance by chance.  
Overall, the rating scale is often poorly validated. Note however that what is tested is the 
significance of the rating categories given all other variables in the model. This overall result is then 
hardly surprising given the pertinence of both the Fisher (1959) and the Altman &Rijken (2004) 
models. A further disclaimer is that small samples are not well suited to study the significance of 
rating categories. 
On the left-hand side of Table 5, as soon as 1927, the only rating category to exhibit statistical 
significance  is  the  first  of  the  non-investment  grades  (Ba/  BB).  Well  before  the  passing  of  any 
financial regulation, one may conclude to an investment grade effect, which would then be validated 
for the next 4 years. This investment-grade effect would predate any rating-driven regulation. This 
said, the aim of these tests is to look at the pertinence of the whole rating scale. The core result here is 
then a climax in 1937. This result strongly differs from West (1973) pointing to over-inflated non-
investment grade yields in 1949 and in 1953. Note also that this means drawing attention to the widely 
debated ruling by the Comptroller of the Currency in 1936 instead of focusing on the joint restatement 
                                                 
25 A variable coding for industry codes is the only control for an omitted variable in the non constant variance 
analyses. SIC codes are given in Compustat Industrial Annually (DNum). The weighted analysis successfully 
address concerns about residuals only once a limited number of outliers have been taken out (2 in 1971; 1 in 
1973 and 2 in 1975). Descriptive statistics and results produced here are then for samples without these outliers. 
As previously stated, the complete breakdown of this analysis is available upon request to the author.   22 
by all federal banking authorities in 1938 (see, supra, section 1). On the right hand side of Table 5, 
there is no sign of a particular relevance for the first of non-investment grades. In 1971 and 1973, the 
only rating categories that prove significant are either one rank above (Baa /BBB) or one rank below 
(B /B). Once again, the main result is that most of the rating scale proved significant beyond the 5% 






These  results  can  be  interpreted  as  invalidating  (Ho).  Beyond  acknowledging  that  the 
explanatory power of ratings does change over the selected years, the increase of this explanatory 
power both in 1937and in 1975 provide two hints of a regulatory value. After introducing a theory of 
Table 5 – A Closer Look at the Significance of the Rating Scale   23 
bond rating as coordination variables, Boot et al (2006, p. 112) mentions an exogenous key point: the 
fact that institutional investors face restrictions linked to ratings. Along this line of thoughts, the two 
increases may be interpreted as pointing respectively to the 1936 US Comptroller ruling on bank 
investment and to the 1975 SEC rule on broker-dealers, which would have increased the value of 
ratings as “focal points”. 
 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
Echoing a casual reading of Hickman (1958) that has had some success, West (1973) exhibits 
an over-inflation of non-investment grade corporate bond yields in 1949 and 1953 as a lasting and 
straightforward effect of the 1938 regulation of bank investment. It is then tempting to conclude that 
the  public  use  of  ratings  would  have  altered  how  investors  value  bonds.  Yet,  how  come  other 
developments did not challenge such a straightforward effect? Proponents of a “regulatory induced” 
premium  need  to  investigate  why  arbitrage  by  unconstrained  investors  has  not  taken  place.  For 
example, up to 1953 and under certain conditions, insurers could invest in bonds below the regulatory 
threshold  on  which  West  (1973)  and  others  focused.  Of  course,  one  answer  may  be  that  these 
unconstrained investors did not have a sufficient market power to influence a structurally altered 
market place. Glenn (1976) then introduces a theoretical discussion focusing on the prohibition of 
short-sales. This burden of proof aside, this paper came back on West (1973) with the help of modern 
regression routines and did not find evidence of a “regulatory premium” for non-investment grade 
bond.  This  paper  then  criticizes  an  alleged  straightforward  effect  of  rating  driven  regulations 
introduced  in  the  1930’s. This  contribution  is similar  to  Fridson  (1994,  pp.  49-50)  showing  how 
readers inferring a similar effect from Hickman (1958) were misled (see, supra, section 2). 
Going  beyond  such  a  critique,  the  focus  on  non-investment  grade  bond  yields  may  be 
removed. Another effect of the ruling could be an increase in the reliance on bond ratings for the 
pricing of all bond issues. Looking at the overall pertinence of ratings for investors in the 1930’s and 
1970’s with no spectacular effect as a guide provides a discussion of the standard literature on the 
structural  relation  between  ratings  and  yields.  This  literature  usually  interprets  the  statistical 
significance of ratings  as a proof of their informational value. This paper then  looks at how this 
informational  value  evolves  with  the  passing  of  financial  regulation  using  ratings.  When  the 
explanatory power of ratings changes over the selected cross-sections, the interesting results are that 
there is a climax in 1937 and a striking improvement in 1975. These findings deserve the following 
comments.  
Why do yields gravitate more around ratings in these two years? or what may have caused an 
increased reliance on ratings for these particular years? An appealing idea is that once authorities 
officially endorse ratings, their value as “focal points” rises (see Boot et al (2006)). However, the 
question does remain open. First, difficulties in building first-hand datasets led to an unfortunate lack   24 
of cross sections for years after the passing of the 1975 regulation by the SEC. They would have 
helped to assess whether the 1975 striking improvement lasted or proved a temporary climax as 1937 
did. Secondly, this paper was meant to be a discussion of West (1973) and then relied on data from 
Fisher  (1959).  This  brought  a  number  of  methodological  choices,  which  applied  to  the  1970’s 
extension  for  the  sake  of  comparability.  Overall,  the  present  investigation  may  then  appear 
disconnected from the modern finance literature on the pricing of debt issues (see, for example, Elton 
et al. (2001 &2004)). The overall empirical approach is not fundamentally obsolete but there would be 
a lot to gain in importing more sophisticated credit risk pricing techniques. Thirdly, this finding needs 
to be further investigated by looking at the dynamics of the relationship between ratings and yields. 
Given the liquidity of the corporate bond market up to the 1940’s (see Biais &Green (2007)), a more 
promising strategy would focus on how yields react to rating changes before and after the enactments 
of the 1930’s (see Jorion et al. (2005) and Boot et al. (2006)).  
These improvements may bring a better view on whether the use of rating in regulations had 
an  impact  on  their  value  for  investors.  Yet  an  “informational”  framework  may  be  restrictive  for 
studying the impact of these financial regulations. For example, recent contributions suggest paying 
more  attention  to  the  capital  structure  of  corporations  (see  Faulkender  &Peterson  (2006),  Kisgen 
(2006),  Sufi  (2009)  and  Kisgen  (2009)).  A  look  at  the  balance  sheet  of  the  regulated  financial 
intermediaries is also well deserved. Musing on the choice of 1930’s regulators, Flandreau et al. (2009, 
p. 23) pioneered this perspective by computing the nominal benefit from booking at face value. Last 
but not least, in an early comment of the regulations enacted in the 1930’s, Harold (1938, pp. 33-34) 
mentioned  a  first  “practical  effect”  on  non-investment  grade  yields  but  also  “more  far  reaching 
effects” such as the development of other more yielding avenues of investment. About 70 years later, 
comments on the recent credit crisis often noted that regulatory arbitrage had been a rationale for the 
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ANNEX - A 
 
 
Source: Pandini (1969, p 221)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 